To explain the low-frequency variation in US equity and debt returns in the 20th century,
Some of the most dramatic historical episodes in equity markets have coincided with changes in housing markets. For example, the equity premium was very high in the 1930s when the value of the housing stock was low relative to output, while the gradual decline in the equity premium in the post-war period coincided with a sustained increase in housing values. Standard asset pricing models do not explain this time-variation in equity premia. This paper explores whether changes in the value of the housing stock can account for the timing and magnitude of these changes in equity markets. Its focus is on the collateral effect of housing, also referred to as the credit channel. Exploring the link between the housing market and the equity market is a pressing research question, given the recent turmoil in the market for housing credit and its spill-overs in the equity market.
To explore this question, we model households who differ by their income histories. They share income risk by trading contingent claims, but they cannot borrow more than the value of their house. When housing collateral is scarce, this borrowing constraint limits risk sharing more.
This reduced ability to borrow results makes households require higher risk premia to hold risky assets, such as stocks. Thus, risk premia vary over time and co-move with housing collateral. This modest friction is a realistic one for an advanced economy like the US, given the eminence of housing amongst collateral assets.
Earlier work in Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) explored the empirical relationship between housing collateral and stock returns. It established an empirical relationship between the value of housing collateral and stock market returns in the US and tested the model's Euler equation on the cross-section of book-to-market portfolios. As such, it provided useful empirical support for the presence of a housing collateral effect. However, it did not show whether an equilibrium asset pricing model would be able to generate meaningful variation in risk premia over time as a result of this collateral channel, nor how large the effects could be. It is exactly this quantitative dimension that is missing for many risk premia-generating explanations. Regression-based evidence on a mechanism that links state variables to returns is unconvincing when a calibrated model of that link fails to deliver the same magnitudes. Explicitly solving the model is a key step in advancing the housing collateral mechanism (or any mechanism for that matter) as a serious candidate for understanding asset returns. Importantly, any policy question that wants to understand how This historical accounting exercise, based solely on observables, makes the model's successes and failures more apparent, and ultimately lends credibility to the explanation. Our quantitative asset pricing results show that the housing collateral mechanism is able to induce the observed amount of time-variation in risk premia. Second, the representative-agent models could only address the long-run decline in the US equity premium through a radical change in the time series process for aggregate consumption growth, which may be hard to detect in the data. Third, by relying on an imperfect risk-sharing channel, the model speaks to the facts on income and consumption inequality that have been documented in the macro literature (Krueger and Perri (2006) and Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2006b) ).
This paper contributes to the literature that studies asset prices in a heterogeneous agent economy model (e.g., Telmer (1993) , Constantinides and Duffie (1996) , Geanakoplos and Zame (2000) , Kubler and Schmedders (2003) , Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2006) , and Jermann (2000, 2001) and Lustig (2007) ). Heterogenous households trade a complete menu of assets, but they face endogenous solvency constraints because they can repudiate their debts.
When a household chooses to repudiate its debts, it loses all its housing wealth but its labor income is protected from creditors. The household is not excluded from trading. In Kehoe and Levine (1993) , Krueger (1999) , Kehoe and Perri (2002) , and Krueger and Perri (2006) , limited commitment is also the source of incomplete risk-sharing, but the outside option upon default is exclusion from all future risk sharing arrangements. Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show how to decentralize these Kehoe and Levine (1993) equilibria with sequential trade. Compared to this work, the focus of our exercise is on generating more time-variation in risk premia. As in Lustig (2007) , we model the outside option as bankruptcy with loss of all collateral assets; all promises are backed by all collateral assets. The driving force in that model is an increasing income dispersion in recessions. In this paper, we add a new driving force: changes in the housing collateral ratio.
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These two forces interact to deliver high equity premia, volatile equity premia, and high Sharpe ratios when collateral is scarce. Our work also connects closely to the work of Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2002, 2006) , which studies the impact of borrowing constraints and income shock dispersion on equilibrium housing prices.
Alternative explanations for the low-frequency evolution of asset prices abound: changing demographics (Geanakoplos, Magill and Quinzii (2004) ), taxation (McGrattan and Prescott (2005) ), stock market participation (Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) , Calvet, Gonzalez-Eiras and Sadini (2003) 2 Our emphasis on housing, rather than financial assets, reflects three features of the US economy: the participation rate in housing markets is very high (68% of households own their home), the value of the residential real estate makes up over seventy-five percent of total assets for the median household (Survey of Consumer Finances, 2001) , and housing is a prime source of collateral (75% of household borrowing in the data is collateralized by housing wealth, US Flow of Funds, 2003) . To keep the exposition of the model simple, we abstract from financial assets or other kinds of capital (such as cars) that households may use to collateralize loans. However, in the calibration we explore the effects of using a broader measure of collateral.
and Guvenen (2005) ), stock market regulation, globalization, consumption growth volatility (Lettau, Ludvigson and Wachter (2005) ), and technology (Pastor and Veronesi (2005) and Jermann and Quadrini (2006) ). None of these papers attempts to simultaneously explain both time-series and cross-sectional return variation, based on imperfect risk-sharing among households. Thus, housing collateral potentially offers a unified explanation for a broad set of long-run and short-run facts.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 sets up the model. Section 2 explains the equilibrium dynamics of the two driving forces: the wealth distribution and the housing collateral ratio. We calibrate the model in Section 3. We then feed the model seven decades worth of US data on aggregate consumption growth and housing collateral ratio dynamics. Section 4 computes the model-implied equity premium and risk-free rate, and compares their low-frequency evolution to the one in the US data. Section 5 shows that the housing explanation is consistent with several additional asset pricing facts. It studies the model's return predictability implications, its Sharpe ratio variability, and its unconditional asset pricing moments. The appendix provides proofs of the propositions, details of the calibration and the computational algorithm, and it contains further detail on unconditional asset pricing moments.
Model

Environment
Uncertainty The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived households. The structure of uncertainty is twofold: s = (y, z) is an event that consists of a household-specific component y ∈ Y and an aggregate component z ∈ Z. These events take on values on a discrete grid S = Y × Z. We use s t = (y t , z t ) to denote the history of events. S t denotes the set of possible histories up until time t. The state s follows a Markov process with transition probabilities π that obey:
Because of the law of large numbers, π z (y) denotes both the fraction of households drawing y when the aggregate event is z and the probability that a given household is in state y when the aggregate state is z.
be stored. The households rank consumption streams according to the criterion:
where δ is the time discount factor. The households have power utility over a CES-composite consumption good:
The parameter ψ > 0 converts the housing stock into a service flow, γ governs the degree of relative risk aversion, and ε is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between non-durable consumption and housing services.
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Endowments The aggregate endowment of the non-durable consumption good is denoted {c a }.
The growth rate of the aggregate endowment depends only on the current aggregate state: c
Each household is endowed with a labor income stream {η}. The labor income shareη(y t , z t ) = η(y t , z t )/c a (z t ), only depends on the current state of nature. Since the aggregate endowment is the sum of the individual endowments,
The aggregate endowment of housing services is denoted {h a }, while ρ(z t ) denotes the relative price of a unit of housing services. The calibration specifies a process for the ratio of non-housing expenditures and housing services expenditures {r},
rather than for {h a } directly. This follows Piazzesi, Schneider and Tuzel (2007) , who study the effects of non-separable preferences between non-housing and housing consumption in a representativeagent framework.
Trading For simplicity, we assume that there is no net positive wealth other than housing wealth. No trade in stocks takes place in the model, but because a complete menu of assets is traded, explicitly allowing such trade would obviously not change any equilibrium prices (as in Lucas (1978)). In our calibration, we do include other sources of collateralizable financial wealth. To 4 The preferences belong to the class of homothetic power utility functions of Eichenbaum and Hansen (1990) . Special cases are separability (ε = γ −1 ) and Cobb-Douglas preferences (ε = 1).
isolate the collateral mechanism, we choose the simplest model of housing markets, abstracting from other frictions.
Each household is assigned a label (ℓ, s 0 ), where ℓ denotes the time-zero collateral wealth of this household. The cross-sectional distribution of this initial collateral wealth and of income states (ℓ, s 0 ) is denoted L 0 . So, ℓ denotes the value of the initial claim to all wealth except for human wealth. This is housing wealth in the model, but also any financial wealth that is in zero net aggregate supply in a broader interpretation. We let {c(ℓ, s 0 )} denote the stream of consumption and we let {h(ℓ, s 0 )} denote the stream of housing services of a household of type (ℓ, s 0 ). 
Next period wealth is labor income, plus assets, plus the cum-dividend value of owned housing:
Collateral Constraints Households can default on their debts. When the household defaults, it keeps its labor income in all future periods. The household is not excluded from trading, even in the same period. However, all collateral wealth is taken away. As a result, the markets impose a solvency constraint that keeps the households from defaulting: all of a household's state-contingent promises must be backed by the cum-dividend value of its housing owned at the end of period t,
. In each node s t , households face a separate collateral constraint for each future event s ′ :
As in Alvarez and Jermann (2000) , these constraints are not too tight: they allow for the maximal degree of risk sharing while preventing default, given that households cannot be excluded from trading.
Equilibrium Asset Prices
Competitive Equilibrium. Given a distribution over initial non-labor wealth and initial states L 0 , a competitive equilibrium is a feasible allocation {c(ℓ, s t ), h r (ℓ, s t ), a(ℓ, s t ), h o (ℓ, s t )} and prices q, p h , ρ such that (i) for given prices and initial wealth, the allocation solves each household's maximization problem (1) s.t. (2), (3) and (4), and (ii) the markets for the consumption good, the housing services, the contingent claims and housing ownership shares clear.
To rule out arbitrage opportunities, payoffs in each state of the world are priced by the unconstrained households at every date and state (Alvarez and Jermann (2000) ). These unconstrained households have the highest intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS):
The second equality follows directly from the form of the utility function, the definition of the expenditure ratio r = 
Inside the Model
This section explains in detail how movements in the housing collateral ratio induce variation in conditional asset pricing moments. To characterize the equilibrium consumption dynamics and link these to the state prices of consumption, we use stochastic consumption weights. This section can be skipped by readers mainly interested in the asset pricing results.
Equilibrium Consumption Dynamics and the Collateral Ratio
Following Lustig (2007), we use a simple risk-sharing rule to characterize the equilibrium consumption choices for each household in an equivalent time zero trading environment.
be the cumulative Lagrange multiplier on the collateral constraint (4) at time t for household (ℓ, s 0 ), where ζ t (ℓ, s t ) = 1 − s τ s t γ τ (ℓ, s τ ) adds all the multipliers γ along the path leading to that node; χ is the inverse of the multiplier on the time zero budget constraint.
When the constraint does not bind, its Lagrange multiplier is zero, and the household's cumulative multiplier remains unchanged. But when the constraint binds, the multiplier increases to a cutoff level ξ t (y t , z t ). This cutoff is the consumption share at which the collateral constraint holds with equality. Note that the cutoff only depends on the current event y t , not on the entire history. Summarizing the dynamics:
The aggregate weight process ξ a t (z t ) summarizes to what extent collateral constraints bind on average, i.e. across households:
.
are completely determined by the ratio
. This ratio captures the household's position in the wealth distribution.
We verify in a separate appendix that this rule satisfies the first order condition for non-housing and housing consumption and the market clearing conditions. Combining (7) and (6), when a household switches to a state with a binding constraint, its consumption share increases. Everywhere else, its consumption share is drifting downwards at the rate shocks to the wealth distribution. Because they follow from an inability to insure against human wealth shocks, these can be interpreted as liquidity shocks.
Combining the risk-sharing rule (7) for unconstrained households (ξ t+1 (ℓ, s t+1 ) = ξ t (ℓ, s t )) and (5), we obtain a new expression for the SDF:
For future reference, we denote the equilibrium price of a claim to some payoff stream {d} in units of z t consumption as
where M t,t+j = m t+1 m t+2 . . . m t+j is the j-period ahead pricing kernel.
A Benchmark Economy The perfect insurance environment provides a useful benchmark for understanding asset prices. Because households are never constrained, the individual multiplier stays constant at its initial value: ξ t (ℓ, s t ) = ξ 0 (ℓ, s 0 ). The aggregate weight process reflects the initial wealth distribution and is constant:
. Φ 0 is the initial distribution of multipliers ξ 0 , a monotone transformation of the initial wealth distribution L 0 . Consumption shares are constant, consumption levels only move with aggregate consumption and there is full insurance. All agents equate their IMRS and the SDF is the standard Breeden-Lucas pricing kernel, adjusted for a composition factor that arises from the non-separability between non-housing and housing consumption (see Piazzesi et al. (2007) ). It contains only the first two factors in (8).
A Multiplicative Discount Factor Adjustment Under our calibration, the composition effect alone is unable to generate enough variation in conditional asset pricing moments. The bulk of the action in the SDF comes from the collateral effect instead. The latter does not hinge on the non-separability of preferences, but relies on imperfect consumption insurance among heterogenous households, induced by occasionally binding collateral constraints. The third term of the SDF in (8) reflects this departure from perfect insurance and it measures the risk of binding solvency constraints. It is the growth rate of the aggregate consumption weight process ξ a t+1 , raised to the power of risk aversion γ. When many households are severely constrained in state z t+1 (ξ a (z t+1 ) >> ξ a (z t )), the price of consumption in that state is much higher, and the unconstrained households experience high marginal utility growth. Intuitively, when lots of households run into binding constraints and experience consumption share increases, the unconstrained households have to experience large decreases in their consumption shares. The increase in the price of consumption induces them to accept low consumption growth rates. When nobody is constrained, the aggregate consumption weight process stays constant, ξ a (z t+1 ) = ξ a (z t ), and the representative agent SDF re-emerges. The risk of binding solvency constraints endogenously creates heteroscedasticity in the SDF.
Housing Collateral The novel feature of this model is that the tightness of the constraints, and therefore the size of the multiplicative adjustment to the SDF, depends on the ratio of aggregate housing wealth to aggregate total wealth, my (z t ):
The numerator measures the value of collateralizable wealth; it equals the price of a claim to the aggregate housing dividend. The denominator is the sum of collateralizable housing wealth and non-collateralizable human wealth. If the expenditure ratio r is constant, the collateral ratio equals 1 1+r
. If r varies over time in a persistent manner, then the housing collateral ratio my inherits this persistent variation. This variation in the collateral ratio affects and therefore the amount of risk sharing that can be sustained and equilibrium asset prices. We formalize this in the following two propositions, proven in appendix A.
If the total housing claim is sufficiently valuable, then perfect risk sharing can be sustained.
denote the price of that claim under perfect risk-sharing and let r = r max denote the maximum expenditure ratio. Perfect risk sharing can be sustained if
This condition guarantees that each household can consume the average endowment without violating its collateral constraint. The following proposition states that an economy with more housing collateral (lower r) has lower cutoffs ξ, thereby allowing for more consumption smoothing. Such an increase in the supply of collateral brings the cutoff consumption share closer to its lower bound of zero. In the limit perfect risk-sharing obtains. Conversely, a decrease in the supply of collateral (higher r) brings the cutoff rules closer to their upper bound, the labor income sharesη. In the limit, as the collateral disappears, the economy reverts to autarky (no risk sharing).
Proposition 3. Assume utility is separable and consider two economies, denoted by superscripts 1 and 2. If r
Differences in the r process affect the equilibrium aggregate multiplier process ξ a . An economy with a uniformly lower housing collateral (higher r) process has higher liquidity shocks and lower average interest rates (or equivalently higher average state prices):
Corollary 1. Assume utility is separable and consider two economies, 1 and 2. Fix the distribution of initial multipliers across economies:
Computation These aggregate weight shocks play a key role in the numerical computation of equilibria. To solve the model numerically, we rely on an approximation of the growth rate of the aggregate weight shock
using a truncated history of aggregate shocks. The computational strategy is discussed in detail in appendix B.
Two Driving Forces
To build intuition for the asset pricing results, we first explain the two exogenous driving forces of the model: shocks to the income distribution, operating at business cycle frequencies, and variation in the housing collateral ratio, operating at low frequencies. Both of these forces affect the SDF m t+1 in (8) through its third term g γ t+1 , which is a function of the aggregate weight shock
Shocks to the Wealth Distribution We build in a higher cross-sectional income dispersion in a low aggregate consumption growth state, a mechanism pioneered in Mankiw (1986), Constantinides and Duffie (1996), and Lustig (2007) . Because risk sharing is imperfect, this income dispersion effect results in more wealth and consumption dispersion. First, the household cutoff levels are higher in low aggregate consumption growth states, ξ(y t , z t−1 , re) > ξ(y t , z t−1 , ex), and this makes the consumption increase for households that switch to a state with a binding constraint larger. Second, low aggregate consumption growth states are short-lived in our model and agents are more constrained in these states as a result, because of their desire to smooth out its effect on their consumption. As the combined result of these two forces, the size of the aggregate weight shock increases more in low aggregate consumption growth states (g t+1 (z t , re) > g t+1 (z t , ex)).
However, after a low aggregate consumption growth shock accompanied by a large aggregate weight shock g t+1 , the left tail of the wealth distribution is cleansed, and subsequent aggregate weight shocks are much smaller. This cleansing mechanism lowers the conditional market price of risk
] and increases the interest rate after a bad shock. These wealth distribution dynamics are a first source of heteroscedasticity in the SDF, and will allow the model to match business cycle-frequency variation in stock returns.
Housing Collateral Mechanism The second source of heteroscedasticity is low frequency changes in the housing collateral ratio, this paper's novel feature. Movements in the housing collateral ratio that come from exogenous movement in the non-housing expenditure ratio r together with endogenous movements in the SDF (equation 9). It is these low frequency movements in the housing collateral ratio that allow the model the match asset prices at low frequencies. Figure 1 illustrates the collateral mechanism for a typical two hundred period simulation of the benchmark model. The calibration is in section 3 below. Panel 1 plots the housing collateral ratio my (bold, right axis) together with the expenditure ratio r (single line, left axis). It shows that the housing collateral ratio increases when households spend a larger share of income on housing. The persistence of my comes from this relationship. Panel 2 plots the cross-sectional consumption growth dispersion (single line, left axis) against the housing collateral ratio my (bold line, right axis). It summarizes the risk sharing dynamics in the model. When collateral is scarce, more households run into binding collateral constraints. To prevent default, the consumption share of the constrained households increases. At the same time, the unconstrained households' consumption share decreases precipitously (see equation 7). As a result, the cross-sectional standard deviation of consumption growth increases, evidence of less risk-sharing. For example, in a period of collateral abundance (period 126), σ t [∆ log c t+1 ] is 8.1%, whereas in a period of collateral scarcity (period 174), it is only 0.9%.
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The aggregate weight shock g t+1 , plotted in panel 3, measures the economy-wide extent to which the solvency constraints bind. It also governs the new component to the SDF g γ t+1 . The panel illustrates that when collateral is scarce, constraints bind more frequently and more severely and this is reflected in a large aggregate weight shock. For example, in period 126 the liquidity shock is 1.07, whereas in period 174 it is only 1.01. The SDF is higher, more volatile, and quite far from the representative-agent SDF in such periods of collateral scarcity.
[ Figure 1 
about here.]
Equity Premium The next panels illustrate how this impacts asset prices. The fourth panel of figure 1 shows that the conditional expected excess return on a (non-levered) claim to aggregate consumption (dotted line, left axis) is higher in periods of collateral scarcity (full line right axis). The conditional equity premium is 13.5% when my is low (period 126), but only 4.5% when the housing collateral ratio is high (period 174). The fifth panel shows that the conditional volatility of the excess return on the consumption claim (left axis) is 10.3% when collateral is abundant (period 174) and more than doubles to 24% when collateral is scarce (period 126). The net result of the collateral mechanism is a conditional Sharpe ratio (
t+1 ]) that is higher in times of collateral scarcity (sixth panel). It is .34 in period 174 and almost .57 in period 126. Figure 2 summarizes the conditional asset pricing moments somewhat differently. It plots the averages of these conditional asset pricing moments against the value of the collateral ratio. The entire time-series of conditional asset pricing moments is computed, then averaged over histories of the aggregate state (z t−1 , · · · , z t−k ), sorted according to whether the last aggregate shock realization z t was high (dashed line) or low (full line), and then sorted according to my. Concentrating on the dashed lines, the equity premium is 9% higher when collateral is scarce (my = .04) than when it is abundant (my = .10) in the first panel. The other two panels in the top row match our earlier findings of higher conditional volatility and Sharpe ratios when collateral is scarce.
9 The bottom row shows that the conditional market price of risk
], an upper bound on the Sharpe ratio, is higher when collateral is scarce (panel 4). The price-dividend ratio in panel 5 is also higher when collateral is scarce because the demand for insurance against binding solvency constraints drives up the price of stocks. It also drives up the price of bonds. So, the model simultaneously generates a high equity premium and a high price-dividend ratio because the risk-free rate is low when collateral is scarce (panel 6).
[ Figure 2 about here.]
Calibration
Income Process There are two driving forces in the model: the income process and the nonhousing expenditure ratio. The first driving force in the model is the Markov process for the nondurable endowment process. It has an aggregate and an idiosyncratic component. The aggregate endowment growth process is taken from Mehra and Prescott (1985) and replicates the moments of aggregate consumption growth in the 1871-1979 data. Aggregate endowment growth, λ, follows an autoregressive process:
with ρ λ = −.14, E(λ) = .0183 and σ(λ) = .0357. We discretize the AR(1) process with two aggregate growth states z = (ex, re) = [1.04, .96] (for expansion and recession) and an aggregate state transition matrix [.83, .17; .69, .31] . The implied ratio of the probability of a high aggregate endowment growth state to the probability of a low aggregate endowment growth state is 2.65. The unconditional probability of a low endowment growth state is 27.4%. This matches the observed frequency of recessions.
An important stylized fact about idiosyncratic labor income volatility in the US is that it increases in recessions (Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004)). Our calibrated labor income process is designed to capture this feature. Following Alvarez and Jermann (2001) , log labor income shares follow an AR (1) Expenditure Ratio The second driving force in the model is the process for the ratio of nonhousing to housing expenditures {r}. Calibrating the expenditure ratio is equivalent to calibrating the evolution of the aggregate housing stock {h} and imposing the intra-temporal optimality condition. Following Piazzesi et al. (2007), we specify an autoregressive process which also depends on aggregate endowment growth λ:
where ν t+1 is an i.i.d. standard normal process with mean zero, orthogonal to λ t+1 . In our benchmark calibration we set ρ r = .96, b r = .93 and σ r = .03. The parameter values come from estimating equation (10) on US data. 11 We discretize the process for log(r) as a five-state Markov process. A second calibration switches off the effect of consumption growth by setting b r = 0. Both calibrations fix σ r = .03. We choose the constantr to match the average housing expenditure share of 19% in the data (NIPA, 1929 (NIPA, to 2004 .
Average Housing Collateral Ratio A key quantitative question is whether collateral is sufficiently scarce for our borrowing constraints to have a sufficiently large effect. Because this question is an important one, we consider two measures to calibrate the average ratio of collateral wealth to total wealth. The first measure focuses on housing collateral, the second measure includes non-housing sources of collateral.
We measure factor payments to housing wealth as total US rental income and factor payments to human wealth as labor income (compensation of employees). NIPA data show that rental income was 3.4% of rental income plus labor income in 1946-2002 and 4.3% in 1929-2002 . Because the factor payments ratio maps directly into the housing collateral ratio, the data suggest a housing collateral ratio less than 5%.
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Our second estimate is a broad collateral measure; it includes financial wealth, defined as the market value of the non-farm non-financial corporate sector in the US. We assume that this financial wealth is fully collateralizable, despite the fact that many forms of non-housing wealth are less collateralizable than housing wealth in real life. We add interest payments and dividend 10 The one difference with the Storesletten et al. (2004) calibration is that recessions are shorter in our calibration. In their paper the economy is in the low aggregate endowment growth state half of the time. That implies that the unconditional variance of our labor income process is lower.
11 Table 1 in a separate appendix shows regression estimates for ρ r and b r . 12 If r is constant, the housing collateral ratio or the ratio of housing wealth to total wealth is 1/r 1+1/r = 1/(1 + r). This is a very good approximation for the average collateral ratio in the model with stochastic r.
payments to the income stream from collateralizable wealth and we add proprietary income to the income stream from non-collateralizable wealth. The factor payment ratio increases to 8.6% in the post-war sample and 9.4% in the full sample, suggesting a housing collateral ratio less than 10%.
An alternative approach is to compare the collateralizable wealth to income ratio in model and data. Assuming that the average expected return on total collateralizable assets is 9% and the expected dividend growth rate is 3%, then a collateral ratio of 5% implies a collateral wealth-toincome ratio of 85% according to Gordon's growth formula: .85 = .05/(.09 − .03). Likewise, the implied wealth-to-income ratio is 150% when the collateral ratio is 10%. In US data, the 1929-2004 average ratio of mortgages to income is 55%. If we include financial wealth, that ratio increases to 155%. Our benchmark calibration (my = 0.05) produces a collateralizable wealth-to-income ratio of 96%. This approach also points towards a housing collateral ratio of 5% and a broad collateral ratio of 10%.
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We take the model with a 5% collateral ratio as our benchmark and consider the economy with a 10% collateral ratio as an alternative. To simultaneously match the average expenditure share of housing services (r) of 19% and the average ratio of housing wealth to total wealth (my) of 5% or 10%, we scale up the aggregate non-housing endowment.
Preference Parameters In the benchmark calibration, we use additive utility with discount rate δ = .95, coefficient of relative risk aversion γ = 8, and intratemporal elasticity of substitution between non-housing and housing consumption ε = .05. We fix the relative weight on housing in the utility function ψ = 1 throughout.
14 Because our goal is to explain conditional moments of the market return, we choose the parameter γ to match the unconditional market risk premium. We also compute the model for γ ∈ {2, 5, 10} and ε ∈ {.15, .75}. A choice for the parameter ε implies a choice for the volatility of rental prices:
In NIPA data , the left hand side of (11) is .046 and the right-hand side is .041. The implied ε is .098. By choosing a low ε, we impose that rental prices are consistent with the expenditure ratio. A choice for ε closer to one helps to generate a higher average equity premium and lower risk-free rate, at the cost of excessive rental price volatility.
13 Appendix C provides a detailed analysis of this asset value approach to calibrating the collateral share, which does not rely on the Gordon approximation. The appendix explains that a higher my may imply a lower wealth/income ratio in the model, through its effect on the risk-free rate.
14 The Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion
is a linear combination of γ and ε with weights depending on the non-durable expenditure ratio r t . In the simulations r = 4.26 on average, so that the weight on γ is .81 on average. Because r t has low volatility, the degree of risk aversion does not move much over time.
Stock Market Return We define the stock market return as the return on a leveraged claim to the aggregate consumption process {c a t } and denote it by R l . In the data, dividends are more volatile than aggregate consumption. We choose leverage parameter κ = 3, where σ(∆ log d t+1 ) = κσ(∆ log c a t+1 ). 15 We also price a non-levered claim on the aggregate consumption stream, denoted R c . The excess returns, in excess of a risk-free rate, are denoted R l,e and R c,e . Table 1 summarizes the benchmark parametrization and the other values we consider in the sensitivity analysis.
[ Table 1 about here.]
Computation Our computational strategy is to keep track of cross-sectional distributions over wealth and endowments that change over time. Appendix B provides the algorithm.
Model Meets Twentieth Century Data
We explore the model's long-run predictions, using the last seven decades in the US as a testing ground. The value of housing wealth to income shifts dramatically over this period. At the onset of the Great Depression, the mortgage-to-income ratio increases from 25 percent to 50 percent because house prices do not decline as quickly as national income. The ratio subsequently decreases to a minimum of 12 percent by the end of WW-II. After that, the ratio increases almost without interruption to a value of 100 percent today. We focus on three key features of the data: (i) the decline in the volatility of returns and the risk-free rate, (ii) the low-frequency variation in the average risk-free rate, and (iii) the long-run decline in the equity premium since WW-II. Taking as given the observed evolution of the housing collateral ratio, the model replicates all three features.
We use two distinct measures of the housing collateral stock: the value of outstanding home mortgages (MO) and the market value of residential real estate wealth (RW ). The data are from We feed the observed aggregate consumption growth shocks and the observed housing collateral ratio between 1929 and 2003 into the model. To match the frequency of recessions in the data, we define a recession as a year in which aggregate consumption growth drops one standard deviation below its sample mean. We use both measures of the collateral ratio: mortgages to national income,
M Ot Yt
, and residential wealth to national income } from their sample average in the data to the percentage deviations of my in the model by feeding in the right r t process.
Declining Risk Premium and Risk-free Rate Volatility The first panel of Table 2 documents a pronounced long-run decrease in the volatilities of excess stock market returns and risk-free rates. The standard deviation of excess stock returns declines from 30% in the 1930s to 10% in the 1990s, while the standard deviation of the risk-free rate declines from around 7% to 2%. While inflation was more volatile in the early decades, the volatility of the risk-free rate cannot be accounted for by inflation surprises alone. The second column (σ(r f ex−post )) reports annual risk-free rates computed from annualizing the difference between the monthly three-month T-bill rate minus the inflation rate in the same month. The third column subtracts the previous month's inflation rate instead (σ(r f ex−ante )). The small difference between the two suggests this volatility is not exclusively due to inflation surprises. Most asset pricing models target a stable risk-free rate, but the data suggest that the stability of the risk-free rate is a recent phenomenon. Our model can account for the low-frequency decline in volatility.
[ Table 2 about here.]
The model matches the volatility decline in returns. In the benchmark calibration (panel 2 of Figure 2 ), the standard deviation of the return on an un-levered claim to aggregate consumption declines from 36% percent in the 1930s to 12% in the 1990s when we use the mortgage-based collateral measure (column 1); it declines from 23% to 12% for the residential wealth-based measure (column 3). The model also delivers a steep decline in risk-free rate volatility: from 21% to 11% in column 2 and from 16% to 11% in column 4. While this decline is consistent with the data, the model induces too much volatility in the risk-free rate. A modified version of our model with Epstein and Zin (1989) -type preferences mitigates this problem; details of that model are available in a separate appendix. An increase in the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution to 0.2 from .125, while keeping the risk aversion coefficient constant at its benchmark value of 8, allows us to roughly match the volatility. Panel 3 shows that the risk-free volatility now declines from 10% to 3%, in line with the data. At the same time, this model preserves the steep decline in the stock return volatility: from 29% to 4%.
Level of the Risk-free Rate The risk-free rate is low when housing collateral is scarce, both in the model and in the data, because the demand for insurance pushes up the price of future consumption. To focus on the long-run dynamics we compute the 9-year moving average of the one-year risk-free rate in the data and in the model. The top row of Figure 3 plots the data, the bottom row plots the model-generated data; the left panel uses the mortgage-based measure and the right panel uses the residential wealth-based measure.
The data reveal a strong positive correlation between the long-run risk-free rate and the housing collateral measure: 0.75 in the left panel and 0.83 in the right panel. The initial increase in housing collateral in the late 1920s coincides with an increase in the risk-free rate. At the start of the 1930s, the risk-free rate declines precipitously and this decline coincides with a decline in the housing collateral ratio. During WW-II, the federal government did keep real interest rates artificially low.
In the post-war period, the two series continue to co-move until the mid-1990s.
The model produces a similar low-frequency pattern for the risk-free rate. The bottom row of Figure 3 shows that the model predicts the decline in the risk-free rate in the Great Depression, the increase in the late 1940s, the decline in the 1960s, the rise in the 1970s, and the decline in the 1980s and early 1990s. Since the mid-1990s, the model predicts an increase in the risk-free rate because housing collateral has become more abundant. One notable divergence is that the increase in housing collateral in the last 10 years did not lead to a commensurate increase in the interest rate. We conjecture that this may be due to the unprecedented outflow of collateral wealth from the US in the last decade. This is an interesting topic for future research, which the current model abstracts from.
[ Figure 3 about here.] Equity Premium Finally, our model generates a long-run decline in the equity premium as well as large unexpected return in the 1990s. Many authors have argued that the equity premium has declined substantially over the last four decades. Jagannathan et al. (2000) use Gordon's growth formula to back out the equity premium and conclude it has declined from 8% in the 1940s to 1% in the 1990s. Fama and French (2002) argue that, because of a decrease in the equity premium, capital gains were much higher than expected, especially in the 1990s. Because housing collateral became more abundant since the 1940s, our model delivers this slow decline in the equity premium. In the benchmark economy, the average equity premium (E E t [R e t+1 ] ) declines from 10.6% in the 1940s and a high of 11.2% in the 1960s to 5.5% in the 2000s (first column of Table 3 ). The model also generates the large unexpected capital gains of the 1990s. The second column reports the sample average of the realized excess return in each decade, E[R e t+1 ]. The realized return in the 1990s is 15.4%, much higher than the equity premium of 7.5%.
[ Table 3 about here.]
The decade-by-decade averages somewhat understate the extent of the decline in the equity premium. The left panel on the top row of Figure 4 contrasts the low and the high frequency variation by plotting the model-predicted annual equity premium (dashed line) alongside the 9-year moving-average (solid line). The vertical bars denote recession years. The equity premium is always higher at the onset of a recession. The equity premium peaks at 15% in the early 1940s, while it reaches a low of 3.5% in 2002. At the same time, the conditional volatility of excess stock returns declines from a high of 25% in the early 1930 to a low of 15% in 2002 (left panel on the middle row). Over the same period, the conditional Sharpe ratio declines from .70 to .35 (left panel bottom row).
The predicted variation in conditional excess return moments looks similar to the data. The right panels of figure 4 plot the empirical counterpart to the equity premium, the conditional volatility and the conditional Sharpe ratio of excess returns. To construct these measures, we project realized excess stock return and its realized volatility (constructed from daily data) on the housing collateral measure and the real risk-free rate. Because the housing collateral ratio is slow-moving, we can interpret the projected series as capturing a long-run equity premium and long-run conditional volatility. The conditional Sharpe ratio is the ratio. The equity premium also peaks in the early 1940s around 15% and declines to 5% at the end of the sample (top right panel).
The conditional volatility also goes from 25% to 15% (middle panel), and the Sharpe ratio falls by more than half (bottom panel).
[ 
Time-Varying Asset Returns
To conclude, we show that the model captures two more important features of conditional asset pricing moments: (i) the same return predictability as in the data, and, (ii) highly volatile Sharpe ratios. At the end of this section, we summarize our findings for unconditional asset price moments.
Long Horizon Predictability If expected returns are vary over time with the housing collateral ratio, then we should find that the housing collateral ratio predicts returns. An important question is whether the model can quantitatively replicate the predictability coefficients found in the data.
Panel 1 of table 4 shows results from predictability regressions of long-horizon excess returns on the lagged housing collateral scarcity measure in the data. becomes larger and statistically more significant with the horizon and the R 2 increases. Panel 2 shows that the model replicates the pattern of predictability coefficients surprisingly well. It reports regression results inside the model of excess returns on our measure of housing collateral ratio scarcity. When housing collateral is scarce (my is low), the excess return is high. The magnitude of the slope coefficients is close to the one we find in the data. Moreover, the R 2 of the predictability regression increase with the predictability horizon, just as in the data. We find this negative relationship between my t and the excess return for a non-levered claim, as well as for a levered claim to aggregate consumption (κ = 3).
[ Table 4 about here.]
Sharpe Ratio in the Data Does the model generate enough volatility in the Sharpe ratio and does the Sharpe ratio co-move correctly with the housing collateral ratio? To evaluate our model against the data, we estimate the Sharpe ratio on annual data from 1927-1992 and compare it to the variation in the Sharpe ratio generated by the model. The conditional mean return is the projection of the excess return on the housing collateral ratio, the dividend yield and the ratio of aggregate labor income to consumption, all of which have been shown to forecast annual returns. 17 Likewise, the conditional volatility is the projection of the standard deviation of intra-year monthly returns on the same predictors. We form the Sharpe ratio as the ratio of the predicted excess returns and predicted volatility. Table 5 shows the estimation results for 1 year returns (column 1), but also for 5 year and 10-year cumulative excess returns (columns 2 and 3). The last three rows of the table indicate the unconditional mean and standard deviation of the Sharpe ratio as well as its correlation with the housing collateral ratio. In the estimation, the correlation between the Sharpe ratio and the measure of collateral scarcity my is positive in the data and equal to .25, .32, and .50 for 1, 5 and 10 year cumulative excess returns. [ Table 5 about here.]
Unconditional Asset Pricing Moments Finally, Appendix D discusses the model's unconditional asset pricing moments reported in Table 6 . The model matches the mean equity premium and its volatility, the mean Sharpe ratio, and the mean risk-free rate for the benchmark parametrization. A representative agent economy is unable to deliver these results, even if preferences are non-separable between housing and non-housing consumption. Our model has one major drawback: it generates too much volatility in the risk-free rate. We show that a modest increase in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution goes a long way towards mitigating this problem. Furthermore, the lower volatility of the risk-free rate in the post-war era masks an important, and often overlooked stylized fact: The volatility of the risk-free rate has changed substantially from decade to decade in the US. We argued in section 4 that this is not simply a measurement issue due to changes in inflation volatility, and we showed that our model is consistent with this long-run decline in risk-free rate volatility.
[ Table 6 about here.]
Conclusion
This paper shows how endogenous, state-contingent borrowing constraints interact with the housing market to deliver plausible asset pricing predictions. Equilibrium changes in the value of the housing stock change the degree to which risk sharing takes place. The housing collateral mechanism, in combination with wealth distribution shocks, endogenously generates time-varying volatility in the Sharpe ratio on equity. When confronted with the actual aggregate consumption growth and housing collateral ratio series, the model delivers the same low frequency changes in the level and volatility of the equity premium and the risk-free rate than those we document in the data. It also generates the same predictability patterns and volatile Sharpe ratios as in the data. This paper is part of a broader research agenda that attempts to understand the dynamics of asset prices and the distribution of income and consumption. In Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005), we empirically test the Euler equation of the housing collateral model, and show that the housing collateral ratio forecasts stock returns and helps price the cross-section of value and growth stock portfolios. Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2006a) shows that the housing collateral mechanism is able to deliver a quantitatively meaningful return spread on book-to-market sorted portfolios, and link this feature to the term structure of equity risk premia. Finally, Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2006b) tests the risk-sharing implications of a version of the model with a geographic dimension, using quantity data only. It shows that regional consumption growth in the US is more cross-correlated when the housing collateral supply increases. Conversely, less risk sharing takes place when collateral is scarce. 
A Technical Appendix
This section contains the proofs of the propositions in the main text. For more details on the model (definition of the cumulative multipliers, derivation and optimality of the risk sharing rule and the optimality of the law of motion for the cumulative multipliers), we refer the reader to section 2 of the separate appendix to this paper, available on our web sites.
Condition 1 Section 2 in the separate appendix explains the equivalence between the static and sequential budget constraints and solvency constraints. This equivalence holds only if interest rates are high enough (see Alvarez and Jermann (2000) ). We impose the following condition. Let η max denote the highest possible labor endowment realization in each future, aggregate node z t .
Condition 1. Interest rates are said to be high enough if
This is the equivalent of the condition in Alvarez and Jermann (2000) that interest rates be high enough, translated to an economy with a continuum of consumers. In an economy with a finite number of agents, it is sufficient to require the time zero value of a claim to the aggregate endowment to be finite, but here it is not sufficient for the value of a claim to the average endowment to be finite. for all (y, z, r) with nonzero measure; Φ is the joint measure defined on P(Y ) × P(Z) × B(R). If this condition is satisfied, each household can get a constant and equal share of the aggregate non-durable and housing endowment at all future nodes. That immediately implies that perfect risk-sharing is feasible. If there is a value r max such that any r ′ > r max is measure zero, then perfect risk sharing can be sustained if
Proof of Proposition 2
This condition is sufficient, but not necessary.
Proof of Proposition 3
Assume utility is separable. Let C(ℓ, y t , z t ) denote the cost of claim to consumption in state y t , z t for a household who enters the period with weight ξ . The cutoff rule ξ(y t , z t ) is determined such that the solvency constraint binds exactly: Π y,z t [{η}] = C(ξ, y t , z t ), where C(ξ, y t , z t ) is defined recursively as:
and ξ ′ is determined by the cutoff rule (6). Note that the stochastic discount factor m t+1 (z t+1 ) does not depend on r t (z t ) because we assumed that utility is separable. This also implies that the cost of a claim to labor income Π y,z t [{η}] does not depend on r.
We prove the result for a finite horizon version of this economy. We first assume some arbitrary state prices {p t (s t |s 0 )} for both of these economies. {m t (z t )} denotes the SDF process implied by these state prices. Finally, we use T i to denote the operator that maps the aggregate weight functions {ξ a t (z t )} we start with into a new aggregate function {ξ ′,a t (z t )}.
In the last period T , the cutoff rule is determined such that:
. By backward induction we get that, for a given sequence of ξ a t (z t ) , ℓ 1,c (y t , z t ) < ℓ 2,c (y t , z t ) for all nodes (y t , z t ) in the finite horizon economy. This in turn implies that T 1 ( ξ a t (z t ) ) ≤ T 2 ( ξ a t (z t ) ) for all z t , with strict inequality if at least one of the constraints binds. This follows directly from the definition of
is non-decreasing in ξ(y t , z t ). The proof extends to the infinite horizon economy if the transition matrix has no absorbing states. The reason is that lim T →∞ E t β T −t m T (z T |z t )π z T ,y T does not depend on the current state (y t , z t ). Now, this also implies a new state price function, for each s t :
where p a t (s t |s 0 ) is the representative agent state price. So if we start with the equilibrium state prices for the second economy {p 2 t (s t |s 0 )}, the implied aggregate weights for the first economy will be smaller:
and similarly,
Interest rates between time zero and time t are given by R 
B Computing Stationary Equilibria
In this appendix we show how to compute stationary equilibria. As we noted in section 2, the aggregate weight shock depends on the entire history of aggregate shocks z ∞ . To avoid the curse of dimensionality, we follow Lustig (2007) and truncate aggregate histories. Households only keep track of the last k lags of the aggregate state, z k t = (z t , z t−1 , · · · , z t−k ), and the current expenditure ratio r t (z t ). The current expenditure ratio r t contains additional information not present in the truncated history z k t , namely r t−k . We use R to denote the ergodic set for the process r. For a household starting the period with weight ξ ∈ Ξ, the policy function l(y ′ , z ′ ; ξ, r, z k ) : Ξ × R × Z k → R produces the new individual weight in state (y ′ , z ′ ). There is one policy function l(·) for each pair (y ′ , z ′ ) ∈ Y × Z. The policy function g * (z ′ ; r, z k ) : R × Z k → R forecasts the aggregate weight shock when moving to state z ′ after history (z k , r).
Competitive Equilibrium. A stationary stochastic equilibrium is a time invariant distribution Φ * (r,z k ) (ξ, y) over individual weights, individual endowments, current expenditure ratio, and truncated aggregate histories, and updating rules l(·) and g * (·). For each z k′ , z k with z k′ = z ′ , z k , the distribution satisfies:
where Q ξ, y, r, z k is the transition function induced by the policy functions. The forecast of the aggregate weight shock is given by:
Intertemporal prices are pinned down by the stochastic discount factor in equation (8), using the forecasted shock g * (·) as an approximation to the actual g(·). For any given realization {z}, the actual aggregate weight shock g(·) differs from the forecast g * (·) because the distribution over individual weights and endowments Φ * (·) differs from the actual distribution Φ(·), which depends on z ∞ . The definition of a stationary equilibrium implies that, on average, across aggregate histories, Φ * (·) = Φ(·) and markets clear: The difference between actual consumption and consumption based on a truncated history is zero on average, but not state-by-state. In each state z ′ , the approximation error equals the percentage difference between the actual aggregate weight shock and aggregate weight shock based on a truncated history:
This is the difference between consumption and the endowment. As the truncation parameter k increases, the approximation error decreases because market clearing holds on average in long histories. We use k = 5 lags in all our computations. The percentage allocation errors in (13) provide a clear measure of the closeness to the actual equilibrium. For our benchmark calibration, the average error in a simulation of 10,000 periods is only 0.0011 with standard deviation .0035. The largest error in absolute value is 0.0282.
We compute the approximating equilibrium as follows. The aggregate weight shock process is initialized at the full insurance value (g * = 1) and the corresponding stochastic discount factor is computed. The cutoff rule for the individual weight shocks ensure that the solvency constraints hold with equality. Then we generate a panel of data by simulating the model: {z t } T t=1 for T = 10, 000 and {y t } T t=1 for a cross-section of 5, 000 households. For each truncated history, we store
as the household's identifying label ξ (the re-scaling keeps the state variables stationary), and compute the sample mean of the aggregate weight shock {g * t (z ′ , r, z k )} T t=1 and the resulting stochastic discount factor {m * t (z ′ , r, z k )} T t=1 . A new cut-off rule is computed with these new forecasts. These two steps are iterated on until convergence.
C Calibration: Asset Value Approach
In the main text we used factor payments on collateralizable and non collateralizable wealth to calibrate the housing collateral ratio. Those data were taken from Table 1.12. National Income by Type of Income (NIPA), except for the net interest series which comes from Table 1.13 (net interest paid by domestic corporations, line 8). Here we describe a second approach, based on measuring collateral wealth directly. More precisely, we compare the ratio of collateral wealth to total income in the model and in the data.
We start by measuring the collateral wealth-to-income ratio in the data. Housing collateral wealth is measured as the market value of outstanding mortgages. The residential mortgage series is from the Flow of Funds Tables and is available for the post-war period. Over that period, the average ratio of residential mortgages to labor income plus rental income is 0.55. Financial wealth is measured as the market value of non-farm non-financial corporations in the US This series is constructed based on Flow of Funds data; Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2007) provides the details. Our broad measure of total collateral wealth to total income is constructed as the ratio of residential mortgages plus financial wealth to labor income plus interest income plus dividend income plus proprietor's income. That ratio is 1.55 in post-war data.
We compare these numbers to the housing collateral wealth-to-income ratio in the model. More precisely, we fix an average housing collateral ratio my, simulate the model for a long period, and compute the housing wealth to total income ratio. When my = 0.05, the collateral wealth to income ratio is 0.90, in between the narrow and the broad empirical measure.
What is the effect of a higher housing collateral ratio in the model? When my is higher than 0.05, the collateral wealth-to-income ratio is actually lower than 0.90. To understand this, consider the Gordon growth formula:
collateral wealth total income = collateral income total income
where R is the expected rate of return on total wealth and g is the growth rate of total income. The numerator is effectively the housing collateral ratio, for example 0.075. In the denominator, the aggregate endowment growth rate g is the same across calibrations. Not so for the discount rate R. This discount rate is the sum of the risk premium on a claim to aggregate consumption (the equity premium) and the risk-free rate. In an economy with more collateral, the equity premium goes down, but the interest rate goes up. This interest rate effect dominates the risk premium effect, so that the denominator is increasing in my. It does not help to increase my to generate a large collateral wealth to total income ratio. We find a higher wealth to income ratio of 0.96 for my = 0.035 than the 0.90 for my = 0.05 and the 0.84 for my = 0.075.
The main point is that, with a five percent collateral ratio, our benchmark model allows for a lot of collateral: 90% of the value of national income on average.
D Unconditional Asset Pricing Moments
This appendix discusses the model's unconditional asset pricing implications. Table 6 compares the unconditional first and second moments of asset returns in US data (panel 1), in the collateral model (panels 2 and 4), and in the representative agent model (panel 3). The benchmark calibration in panel 2 generates a 8.6% risk premium on an un-levered equity claim, with a volatility of 21.7%. These numbers line up with the 7.9% excess return in the data and its 20.7% volatility. The Sharpe ratio is 0.397, close to the 0.384 Sharpe ratio observed in 1927-2004. Because consumption growth is less volatile in the data than dividend growth, we also compute a levered claim to aggregate consumption in the model (κ = 3). The model with lower risk aversion (γ = 5) now also generates a sizeable and volatile (levered) risk premium: 3.9% expected excess return with 16.7% standard deviation. We contrast this with a representative agent economy. The equity premium on an un-levered (levered) consumption claim is less than one-third (one-half) as big as in the collateral model, even though preferences are non-separable between non-housing and housing consumption. Finally, doubling the collateral ratio to 10% brings this economy closer to the representative agent economy because the solvency constraints are looser. The expected excess return on a levered consumption claim is still high (5.7%) and volatile (21%) for (γ = 8, ε = .05).
Risk Premium
Risk-free Rate
The model with γ = 8 (γ = 5) generates an average risk free rate of 2.6% (7.7%), close to the 1.9% in the 1871-1979 data. The risk of binding collateral constraints increases the expected SDF more when risk aversion γ is high, and pushes down the risk-free rate. There are two reasons for this fall in the risk-free rate: Households cannot borrow as much, and they accumulate more precautionary savings. When households are more risk averse, the precautionary motive is stronger. They bid up the price of risk-free assets which provide insurance against the risk of binding constraints. In contrast, the risk-free rate increases with γ in the representative agent economy (panel 3). A more risk-averse representative agent is less willing to substitute inter-temporally and wants to borrow more against growing labor income; this drives up the risk-free rate. The level of the risk-free rate is much too high: 15.8% in the benchmark calibration.
The biggest shortcoming of the collateral model is the high unconditional volatility of the risk-free rate. It is 7% in the economy with γ = 5, 15.6% in the economy with γ = 8, but only 4.2% in the 1927-2002 data and 5.2% in the 1871-1979 data. When the average collateral ratio is 10% instead, the risk-free rate is higher but less volatile (panel 4). Two forces drive this volatility: variation in the expected fraction of households facing binding constraints due to shocks to the wealth distribution (at higher frequencies), and shocks to the risk-sharing technology due to changes in value of housing collateral (at lower frequencies). Both modulate the demand for insurance. While our benchmark calibration generates more risk-free rate volatility that other heterogenous agent models (e.g., 5% in Alvarez and Jermann (2001) and Guvenen (2005) ), these models typically don't generate time-variation in equity premia because their market prices of risk are constant. As we emphasized in section 4, risk-free rates are far from constant. Our model generates a large decline in the risk-free rate volatility between the 1930s and the 1990s, a pattern consistent with the data.
Sensitivity: Recursive Utility One way to mitigate the risk-free rate volatility is to use recursive preferences to de-couple risk aversion from the willingness to substitute consumption over time. Modestly raising the intertemporal elasticity of substitution from 0.0125 to 0.20, while keeping γ = 8, reduces the volatility of the risk-free rate from 15.6% to 6.9% (panel 5). The equity premium is still 4.9% with a volatility of 19.5%.The separate appendix reports more detailed results.
Sensitivity: Composition Effect A higher intratemporal elasticity of substitution (ε) increases the equity premium and the Sharpe ratio and lowers the risk-free rate (panel 6). This effect also shows up in the representative agent economy; Piazzesi et al. (2007) refer to it as a negative composition effect. Assets that pay off in low non-housing expenditure share growth states are risky as such states occur in recessions. An increase in ε from .05 to .75 increases the equity premium by 4% and decreases the risk-free rate by 4% in both our model and the representative agent economy. Detailed results for the representative agent economy are available upon request. However, these empirically plausible return moments come at the expense of an implausibly high rental price growth volatility. For ε = .75, the rental price growth volatility σ(∆ log ρ) is 19% per annum (see equation 11), whereas observed rental price growth volatility is below 5%.Driving ε even closer to 1 leads to exponentially increasing rental price growth volatility. For ε > 1 the representative agent model generates a negative equity premium. We choose ε = .05 for our benchmark calibration because the rental price growth volatility then matches the data. A higher ε also increases risk-free rate volatility.
Sensitivity: Risk Aversion, Expenditure Share, and Income Heteroscedasticity Varying the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ from 2 to 10 (panel 7) increases the equity premium on a levered (non-levered) consumption claim from 0.8% to 15.7% (.3% to 13.3%). The Sharpe ratio increases from .07 to 0.55. The risk-free rate falls from 8.6% to -2.1%. When the expenditure share does not depend on consumption growth (b r = 0 in the specification of r), the housing collateral ratio becomes less volatile. The equity risk premium is now 6.9% with volatility 23.7%. The risk-free rate is 1.8%, and its volatility is 3% lower than in the benchmark model (panel 8). Finally, we shut down the Mankiw (1986) mechanism by having income shocks with the same dispersion in booms as in recessions (panel 9). The housing collateral mechanism alone generates a sizeable 5.7% equity premium. The risk-free rate is 5% higher, but 5% less volatile. Panel 1 reports the volatility of excess stock returns and the risk-free rate in the data. R e is the excess return on the CRSP valueweighted stock index. The nominal risk-free rate i t,t+1 is the annual return on the CRSP 3-month T-bill rate. Inflation π t,t+1 is computed from the BLS consumer price index series. Column 1 reports the annualized standard deviation of excess stock returns, computed as the sample standard deviation of monthly excess returns, where R e t+1 = 12 × ((1 + R t,t+1 ) − (1 + i t,t+1 ) 1/12 ). The second column reports the annualized standard deviation of the ex-post risk-free rate r f t,ex−post = 12 × ((1 + i t,t+1 ) (1/12) − (1 + π t,t+1 )). To minimize the effect of inflation surprises, column 3 reports the annualized standard deviation of an ex-ante risk-free rate which subtracts out the previous month's inflation rate instead: r f t,ex−ante = 12 × ((1 + i t,t+1 ) (1/12) − (1 + π t−1,t )). To compute decade-averages, we only use the last month in each year. Panel 2 reports the same statistics for the model under the benchmark parametrization. The model-simulated data were generated by feeding in observed aggregate consumption growth {zt} T =2000 t=1929 and the observed collateral ratio, measured either based on mortgages {
M Ot Yt
} T =2000 t=1929 or on residential wealth { RWt Yt } T =2000 t=1929 . If aggregate consumption growth at t is one standard deviation below the mean, zt is the low consumption growth state, else zt is classified as the high consumption growth state. This procedure matches the unconditional probability of a low aggregate consumption growth in the model to that in the data. In the model, R e is the excess return on an un-levered claim to aggregate consumption. Panel 3 reports the same statistics as panel 2, but for a model with Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set to 0.2 and the coefficient of relative risk aversion is held at its benchmark value of 8. is the excess return on an un-levered claim to aggregate consumption. We report the sample average of the conditional expected excess return E(Et[R e t+1 ]) and the sample average of the realized excess return E(R e t+1 ) for each decade. The model-simulated data were generated by feeding in observed aggregate consumption growth {zt} T =2000 t=1929 and the observed collateral ratio, measured either based on mortgages {
} T =2000 t=1929 (column 2 and 3) or on residential wealth { RWt Yt } T =2000 t=1929 (column 4 and 5). 
and V ol t+1 = a 0 + a 1 dpt + a 2 lct + a 3 my t + a 4 V olt + a 5 V ol t−1 . The variables dp, lc and my are the dividend yield, the labor income-consumption ratio, and the housing collateral scarcity measure based on the value of mortgages (see Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) for a detailed description of the data). In particular my t = max(myt) − myt/(max(myt) − min(myt)), where max(myt) and min(myt) are the sample minimum and maximum of the housing collateral ratio my. R e denotes the value weighted market return in excess of a 1 month T-bill return. V olt is the standard deviation of the 12 monthly returns in year t. R1, R5, R10 denote the 1-year, 5-year and 10-year ahead cumulative excess returns. The estimation is by GMM with the OLS normal conditions as moment conditions. Standard errors are Newey-West with lag length 3. The estimation period is 1927-1992, the longest common sample. The predicted Sharpe ratio is formed as the ratio of the predicted mean excess return to the predicted standard deviation. The last three rows indicate the sample mean of the predicted Sharpe ratio, its sample standard deviation, and the sample correlation between the Sharpe ratio and the housing collateral scarcity measure my. Averages from a simulation of the model for 5,000 agents and 10,000 periods. In the first column, R l,e denotes the excess return on a levered claim to aggregate consumption growth, with leverage parameter κ = 3. R c,e denotes the excess return on a non-levered claim to aggregate consumption growth. The third column reports the unconditional mean of the risk-free rate. Columns four to six report unconditional standard deviations of levered and non-levered consumption claims and risk-free rate. The last two columns report Sharpe ratios on levered and non-levered consumption claims. Panel 1 reports historical averages for the annual S&P500 return and for the annual real return on a 3-month Treasury bill for the samples 1927-2004 and 1871-1979 (data from Global Financial data). Panels 2-4 are for the benchmark parametrization. Panel 2 reports the results for the economy with a 5 percent average collateral ratio. Panel 3 reports results for the representative agent economy. Panel 4 reports the moments for the collateral economy with 10 percent collateral on average. Panels 5-9 report results from various sensitivity exercises. Panel 5 reports the unconditional asset pricing moments for the model with recursive preferences. Risk aversion is γ = 8 and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 0.2. Panel 6 reports results for different parameters of intratemporal elasticity of substitution between non-housing and housing services consumption ε. All other parameters are held constant at their benchmark level and there is 5 % collateral. Panel 7 varies the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ. Panel 8 is the benchmark calibration but with an expenditure share process is an AR(1): log rt =r + ρr log r t−1 + σrνt, i.e. br = 0. Panel 9 is the benchmark model with 5% collateral, but without conditional heteroscedasticity in the income share process: .6935, .3065, .3065 ] instead of [.6578,.7952,.3422,.2048 ]. The graphs display a two hundred period model simulation under the benchmark parametrization (see Table 1 ). This graph reports average asset pricing moments from a long model simulation under the benchmark parametrization. All series are averaged over histories (z t−1 , · · · , z t−k ), sorted into low zt (λ(zt) = 0.96, full line) and high zt observations (λ(zt) = 1.04, dashed line) and plotted against the housing collateral ratio (horizontal axes). The first row of the figure plots the expected excess return on a claim to aggregate consumption (panel 1), its conditional standard deviation (panel 2) and its Sharpe ratio (panel 3). The second row plots the conditional market price of risk (panel 4), the conditional price-dividend ratio (panel 5), and the risk-free rate (panel 6). The two plots in the first row of the figure plot the 9-year moving average of the annual T-bill rate and the collateral ratio in the data (dashed line). In the left panel the housing collateral ratio is measured as the percentage deviation of the mortgage-based collateral measure from its long-run trend (M O/Y ). The right panel uses the residential wealth-based collateral measure (RW/Y ). The annual risk-free rate is computed from monthly deflated T-Bill returns: r f t,t+1 = 12 × ((1 + i t,t+1 ) (1/12) − (1 + π t,t+1 )), where i is the annual nominal holding period return on 3-month T-bills from CRSP and π is the monthly inflation computed from the BLS consumer price index. The panels in the second row plot the same statistics for the benchmark model. I.e., we feed in the observed aggregate consumption growth and housing collateral data and compute the model-implied 9-year moving average of the annual risk-free rate. 1928 1938 1948 1958 1968 1978 1988 1998 − 1928 1938 1948 1958 1968 1978 1988 1998 − 1928 1938 1948 1958 1968 1978 1988 1998 − This panel plots the conditional expected excess stock market return, its conditional standard deviation and the conditional Sharpe ratio in the model (left column) and in the data (right column). The model-simulated data were generated by feeding in observed aggregate consumption growth {z t } T =2000 t=1929 and the observed collateral ratio, measured based on mortgages { MOt Yt } T =2000
Regressors
t=1929 into the benchmark model. The top panel plots the expected excess return on a claim to aggregate consumption. The middle panel plots the conditional standard deviation of the excess return on a claim to aggregate consumption. The bottom panel plots the conditional Sharpe ratio, the ratio of the expected excess return over its standard deviation. In the right column all conditional asset pricing moments are constructed from the data in the following way. The expected excess return, plotted in the top right panel, is computed by projecting the annual CRSP value-weighted stock return in excess of the annual return on the Fama 3-month T-bill return on the mortgage-based housing collateral ratio and the Fama 3-month T-bill return (less inflation over the previous year). The middle panel plots the conditional standard deviation of the excess return. It is computed from daily data as k∈year (R CRSP k − (1 + i) 1/360 ) 2 . We use daily S&P500 data from Global Financial Data before 1960, and daily CRSP data afterwards. The expected standard deviation is computed by projecting this standard deviation on two lags, the mortgage-based housing collateral ratio and the Fama 3-month T-bill return (less inflation over the previous year). The bottom right panel plots the conditional Sharpe ratio, the ratio of the expected excess return over its standard deviation. 
